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CRISIS OF CITIZENSHIP
OR CITIZENSHIP OF CRISIS?

Establishing a co-original relationship between citizenship and resistance

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Introduction

In recent years, there is a resurrection of studies addressing popular mobilizations, resistance and social movements, protests, (digital) activism, etc. in response to various national and transnational issues, such as refugee crisis, rising authoritarian and populist governments, invasion of consumerism and neoliberalism in people's lives, and the rising tide of xenophobia and ultra-nationalism. Whereas some studies depict these developments as part of the growing "crisis of citizenship,"[1] some others try to explain them by saying that we are witnessing a new "age of resistance."[2] This paper offers an analysis of these two political phenomena – crisis of citizenship and return of resistance – as two deeply connected political processes. In this vein, the main question that I aim to investigate is the following: how can we establish a relationship between crisis of citizenship and return of resistance?

This paper proceeds on the grounds of three main arguments. First, I argue that thinking crisis of citizenship and the question of resistance in relational terms is not only possible, but also *necessary* in order to understand resistance in more concrete terms. In other words, I argue that the best way to understand the concept of resistance theoretically is to put this highly contested concept in relationship with other concepts. In this paper, I bring citizenship to thinking about resistance in such relational terms. Drawing from my first argument, secondly, I argue that resistance and citizenship relationality can also make manifest democratic or anti-democratic aspects of existing democratic systems. The un-democratic *content* of a democratic system can be seen by looking at how it reacts when it meets with resistance. And thirdly, I argue that crisis of citizenship also means citizenship in times of crisis in the sense

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[1] Kaylvas, Andreas (2014), "Solonian Citizenship: Democracy, Conflict, Participation," in Paschalis M. Kitromilides (ed.), *Estratto da Athenian Legacies, European Debates on Citizenship* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore), pp. 19-36.

[2] Douzinas, Costas (2013), *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe* (UK: Polity).

that when the crisis activates a collective response from those who are subject to it, all the existing pre-political differences and tensions arising from these differences are suspended, and there appears a possibility of radical citizenship. In this regard, the encounters between citizenship and resistance (in times of crisis) take place in three interrelated ways: 1) *politics of inclusion*, 2) *politics of exclusion*, and 3) *politics of emancipation*.

In addressing the main question and developing the arguments, this paper consists of three parts. In the first part, I make a short literature review regarding the issues of "crisis of citizenship" and the "return of resistance." In the second part, I establish a conceptual framework by explaining what I understand from the concept of crisis and subsequently the question of crisis of citizenship. In the last part of the paper, I shift my focus from crisis of citizenship to citizenship of crisis (or citizenship in times of crisis) while at the same time suggesting that these are potentially the same crisis situations.

Crisis of Citizenship and Return of Resistance

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of citizenship, as a juridical category, came under scrutiny by many scholars. As a critique of T. H. Marshall's three-tiered development of citizenship as civil, political, and social rights, Brian Turner addresses that the recent developments in global capitalism, industrialization, and military advancements led to an "erosion of citizenship."[3] From a different angle, Ulrich Bech announces that "the old categories of state-centered power and politics are becoming zombie categories."[4] As he suggests, state centric political categories fail to accommodate for he new developments both locally and globally; and in this vein, citizenship can be understood as one of such zombie categories that needs to be reconfigured. Ronald Beiner, on the other hand, points out the changes in the political map of the world after the Cold War, which was coupled with large-scale migrations from poor countries towards the rich, intensification of wars and conflicts along ethnic and religious lines, and globalization as the main reasons why the current political condition is an experience of the "crisis of citizenship."[5] In the context of the United

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[3] Turner, Brian (2001), "The Erosion of Citizenship," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 189-209.
[4] Beck, Ulrich (2001), "Redefining Power in the Global Age: Eight Theses," *Dissent*, available at: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/redefining-power-in-the-global-age-eight-theses.
[5] Beiner, Ronald (2003), *Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays on the Problem of Political Community* (Toronto: UBC Press), pp. 3-4.

States, Sheldon Wolin diagnoses a rather deeper root for the crisis of citizenship: according to him, this crisis is rooted in the very foundation of the United States, in the moment of framing its Constitution. Political subjectivity that was imagined by the framers of the Constitution was not that of an active and collective citizenry but a passive and depoliticized notion of individualism with a discourse of rights (to vote, religion, property): "The Constitution was not designed to encourage citizen action but to prevent arbitrary power, especially the form of power represented by the will of the majority."[6] Crisis of citizenship, in his view, resides in the fact that the economic logic in the founding idea pervades people's energies, activism, and political creativity to generate a collective identity that could consciously disrupts politics-as-usual, and constructs "new life forms."[7]

Another entry point to addressing the crisis of citizenship has been recently introduced as a critique of neoliberalism. Wendy Brown so far has been the forerunner of this critique. Brown's critique addresses the fusion of Western democracy and neoliberalism, within which, she claims, the democratic content of citizenship with its distinctly political character that makes itself visible in episodic eruptions is displaced and unmade by the "neoliberal reason." The ideal figure of democratic citizen, understood as *homo politicus*, is replaced by a new *imaginary* of a citizen, interpellated by institutions of neoliberal governance, thereby appearing as *homo oeconomicus*. In her articulation of the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy (of course that which she mostly draws from Foucault's analysis of neoliberal governmentality), governing institutions gain a market logic and begin to function like businesses and firms; and from this marketization of social and political life arises a new configuration of democracy and citizenship.[8] Under neoliberal governmentality and management, democratic institutions come in proximity to corporations and finance capital, the intimate relationship that which Sheldon Wolin also refers to as the process through which democracy acquires a corporate structure.[9]

Therefore, in the last few decades, crisis of citizenship has been at the forefront of democratic politics. Today it is not only that crisis persists, but also it makes itself even more visible:

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[6] Wolin, Sheldon (2016), "What Revolutionary Action Means Today," in Nicholas Xenos (ed.), *Fugitive Democracy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), p. 370.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 377.

[8] See Brown, Wendy (2015), *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (NY: Zen Books).

[9] Wolin, Sheldon (2008), *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Spectre of Inverted Totalitarianism* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), p. 47.

increasing number of anti-democratic governments, rising support for right wing populisms, civil wars and political turmoil, and refugee crisis at the borders of the European Union, are symptoms that crisis of citizenship has become a global phenomenon that requires urgent action. And unlike Wolin's observations three decades ago abot the political passivity and apathy of the people (whereby he saw a potential – through "rejectionism" – to imagine new life forms), we see everywhere the emergence of collectivities *acting politically*, resisting, and disrupting political processes that ordinary citizens normally have not much access. This brings me to the second point: the question of the return of resistance.

In recent years, we are also witnessing or being part of growing cycles of insurrections, uprisings, rebellions, occupy movements, and various other forms of protests on the streets and squares in different corners of the world. Financial crises, political crises, and state racisms that are sanctioned with violence and incarceration are no longer lived in popular silence, but face genuine types of resistance and disobedience. Riots in *banlieues* in Paris in 2005, *aganaktismenoi* in Athens in 2008, Spanish *indignados*, Occupy movements in the US, London and elsewhere, uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Ukraine, and Rojava Kurdistan show signs of the fact that politics of resistance against systemic injustices and authoritarian governments around the world will continue at least in the near future. Therefore, we see celebratory announcements from left-wing and radical intellectuals and scholars arguing that we are experiencing a new period in history, which is a period of insurrections, reawakening of people power, and rebirth of the revolutionary spirit. The massive energy in the streets and squares made these radical intellectuals adjust their positions regarding their skepticism toward occupy movements and the uprisings in many countries. Costas Douzinas explains this change of perspective in "radical philosophy" by analyzing Hardt and Negri, Zizek, and Badiou's early works and their remarks about people power, and how they rethought their positions afterwards:

"Negri and Hard's *Empire* and *Multitude* were indifferent to the crowd and the 'mass'. Alan Badiou dismissed the Paris, Athens, and London insurrections. Slavoj Zizek was quite critical of the various occupations he visited."[10] But when the uprisings erupted and grew bigger, he

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[10] Douzinas, Costas (2013), *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe* (UK: Polity), p. 176.

continues, these scholars published new works which provided an "implicit apology" for their misjudgment of the "street."[11]

Hence, while one part of the story tells us that we are in times of the "crisis of citizenship," the other part announces that this new age is an "age of resistance."[12] By taking inspiration from these simultaneously happening developments, I argue that we can establish a connection between them. It is not only that we *can* establish the connection, but perhaps we *should* do so. For in so doing, we can not only get a better understanding of democratic citizenship, but also the notion of resistance – which is one of the most frequently used concepts in politics but at the same time a very contested and unclear one – gains a more concrete meaning and explicit content with regards to questions like "resistance against what?" It seems to me that the best way of exploring resistance is to put this concept in dialogue with or in relation to other political concepts. Studying resistance on its own generates more questions than answers. In this paper, I do this by bringing citizenship (and its crisis) in conversation with resistance.

Establishing or diagnosing links between citizenship and resistance becomes even more significant in our understanding of democracy. In democratic theory, we find two main perspectives in analyzing democracy: it is either analyzed as a "form," an institutional design under which the "democratic" as an adjective signifies the method of decision-making,[13] the mode of governance,[14] or more substantially, the society as a whole having the *ethos* of democracy;[15] or it is described as an eruption, a rupture, an event, or *agon* initiated by the uncounted, oppressed, the poor, and the excluded.[16]

Normative theories of democracy as an institutional design seek perfection in existing democratic institutions by introducing certain ideal types. Such studies are vital in questioning and creating better governing institutions. But even though it is not their purpose, these

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[13] Schumpeter, Joseph (2003), *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London and NY: Routledge), p. 242.

[14] Habermas, Jürgen (1996), *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 120.

[15] Many political theorists, from John Rawls, Seyla Benhabib, Jürgen Habermas, follow this substantiated meaning of democracy.

[16] Among scholars thinking of democracy along these lines are Sheldon Wolin, Jacques Rancierei Miguel Abensour, Etienne Balibar, and Laclau and Mouffe.

studies run the risk of diverging our attention away from questions concerning active citizenship, dissent, disobedience, and resistance. Their ideal types of democracy, or immanent critiques of the existing ones, generate an imaginary of democracy (and citizenship) where resistance becomes unnecessary and irrelevant. In such a view, there is resistance bacause democracy is not perfect or well-functioning. An ideal democracy, therefore, should allegedly put an end to the necessity of resistance. On the other hand, looking at institutions simply as mechanisms of pacification, domination, and subjectification, creates an equally problematic image of democracy as temporal, short-lived, fragmented, and spontaneous moments. Locating the time of resistance as the time of democracy runs the risk of forgetting the vitality of institutions that provide citizens with platforms and channels of political participation.

Acknowledging the significance of each perspective, I argue that we need to think of these "two democracies" in a relational way. The democratic or un-democratic *content* of democracy manifests itself when it encounters resistance; while the (anti-)democratic content of resistance makes itself visible only when it creates a *crisis* situation in which there emerges the possibility of democratization and progress towards equality and freedom. In this vein, "crisis of citizenship," I further argue, inhabits the possibility that, when responded by popular and democratic resistance, which is what I define as "citizenship of crisis," then citizenship and resistance enters into a co-constitutive relationship.

The encounters between citizenship and resistance take place in three interrelated ways: 1) in the form of *politics of inclusion* by the excluded, 2) in the form of *politics of exclusion* by the included, and 3) in the form of *politics of emancipation* by the oppressed. At this point, I must emphasize that these three versions are not necessarily mutually exclusive; those who are excluded or included can at the same time be oppressed. In terms of politics of inclusion, resistance-citizenship encounter can appear as *acts of disobedience*, *acts of recognition*, and *acts of citizenship*. But each one of these acts can also be found in the politics of exclusion and politics of emancipation. We usually see *acts of autonomy* or *secession* and *acts of refusal* as the main types of politics of exclusion. And as for the politics of emancipation, in addition to all types of democratic resistance I mentioned above, we also see *acts of revolution* as the most radical demand for transformation.

The Concept of Crisis: A Conceptual Framework

Crisis as a metaphor that we usually evoke in our encounters with emergency situations or a problem that requires urgent action. Whereas "crisis" was historically utilized to describe *time* between life and death (mostly in its medical usage), its conceptual and metaphorical flexibility allows us to use it as part of political, social, and economic lexicons, such as "financial crisis," "economic crisis," "crisis of legitimacy," "crisis of democracy," etc. thereby having multiple meanings in several contexts. As Reinhart Koselleck demonstrates, "[i]n our century, there is virtually no area of life that has not been examined and interpreted through this concept with its inherent demand for decisions and choices."[17] Let us briefly explore how this concept is indeed useful to analyze the relationship between citizenship and resistance.

Crisis is one of the key concepts that entered our political vocabulary from the ancient Greek sources. We learn from Koselleck's conceptual history that crisis [*κρίσις*] finds its etymological roots in the Greek verb *krino* [*κρίνω*], which meant to "choose," "judge," and "decide," as well as to "fight," "measure," and to "quarrel."[18] We encounter its uses in theology and medicine; but crisis was also evoked in the realm of law to indicate situations in which one needs to *decide* between right and wrong, or just and unjust. One of the best examples of this type of usage appears in the Trilogy of *Oresteia* by *Aeschylus* [525-456BC]. In the last part of the Trilogy, we see a conflict, a *stasis*, caused by Orestes and Furies, who travel from Argos to Athens to appeal to Athena for a decision. After Athena listens to defenses from both sides, unable to decide which side is right and which side is wrong, she first defines the situation as a *crisis* ("So it stands. A crisis either way."), and then she invites citizens to form a tribune, not only for this specific case, but "for all times to come."[19] Athena, therefore, invites *judges* to make a *decision* to overcome the *crisis* situation. Her aim however is not to restore the old order, but to critique its corrupt notion of retributive justice. In other words, this crisis for Athena is a *moment* to introduce a new order: "a tribunal for all time to come," which she refers to as the founding of Areopagus. Hence, we see two meanings of crisis in the play: first is the corrupt cycle of revenge that brings the *polis* into

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[17] Koselleck, Reinhart (2006), "Crisis," *Journal of History of Ideas*, Vol. 67, No. 2, p. 358.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] Aeschylus (1977), *Oresteia* (NY: Penguin), pp. 253, 495-500.

misery and darkness; and second is the act of judgment by citizens to disrupt the vicious cycle. As Koselleck precisely underlines, what we distinguish as "subjective critique" and "objective crisis" was a situation that was explained by the same concept, crisis, in ancient Greece.[20]

In modernity, crisis is first used in a political context during the conflict between the King and the Parliament in the seventeenth century England. Benyamin Rudyerd, quoted by Koselleck, describes crisis as the following: "This is the Chrysis of Parliaments; we shall know y this if Parliaments life or die."[21] Here we see the medical notion of crisis being applied to a political situation in which the concept is introduced with a new formulation: it is the moment in which the Parliament would either continue its existence or it would disappear. This political understanding of crisis gains further visibility when the modern state became associated with *body politic* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Brian Milstein points out, crisis in the body politic means a situation in which citizens diagnose a *disease* as doctors, and be subject to the same disease as patients, simultaneously.[22] Especially in the eighteenth century, crisis situations merged with the notion of *progress* and *consciousness*, and gained a normative "emancipatory" content. As we see in Rousseau's and Thomas Paine's descriptions of "revolution," emancipation is no longer sought in an external and/or transcendental source or reference point, but within the rules and norms that members of a society constitute for itself.[23]

In the nineteenth century, we encounter a new application of crisis, this time in the realm of economics by Karl Marx and many other political economists of the radical left against theories of classical market economy.[24] In their perspective, crisis plays out in two ways: first,

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[20] Koselleck (2006), p. 359.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 362.

[22] Milstein, Brian (2015), "Thinking Politically about Crisis: A Pragmatist Perspective," *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 144.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[24] See Marx, Karl (1976), "Crisis Theory," *The Marx-Engels Reader* (2nd ed.), Robert C. Tucker (ed.) (NY: W. W. Norton & Company), pp. 443-465. In this short text, Marx takes issue with classical theories of economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He interprets that the main understanding of crisis for these thinkers, such as Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, and James Mill, is that it occurs when capitalist mode of production is not applied to economy properly. If market economy is pursued perfectly, the danger of crisis can be avoided. In response to their perspective on crisis, Marx argues that crisis is inherent in the working of capitalism; it is the *sine qua non*e of capitalism, and the very reason of its existence. But crisis situations also make available the conditions for the death of capitalist system. In Marx's social-scientific theory of crisis, it appears as the moments in which inner dynamics and contradictions of capitalism come into surface.

crisis is an element that is integral to functioning of the capitalist economy. Crisis situations manifest the contradictions in market dynamics, which are constitutive to capitalist economy's progress, but which hare also capitalism's gravediggers. Second, these crisis situations are also moments in which those who are subject to economic crisis *can* envisage a route leading to an end of capitalism and a beginning of a new economic and political order. Here the question is not whether the existing order will live or die, but the moment between old and new. As Gramsci argues, "the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear."[25]

Putting aside for the moment the implicit notion of progress in the background of Gramsci's statement, we again face the dual situation that we previously observed in ancient Greece: on the one side, crisis is a structural or systemic contradiction that has an effect upon people. But on the other side, it is a moment of interregnum in which people, who are subject to crisis, spring into action, make a crisis-critique, and envision life anew. As Milstein rightly argues, crisis situations mobilize people with various backgrounds (culture, race, ethnicity, religion etc.), suspends their *pre-political* allegiances or essentialized identities, and generates a "crisis community."[26] These cultural and social categories do not disappear forever, but they lose significance so long as crisis persists. A crisis community, refined from its pre-political elements, opens up a possibility for a new type of solidarity, a form of living together; and through its egalitarian, communicative, and dialogical public sphere, it turns the potential of radical democracy into an actual, *episodic*, experience.

If we stick to this dual notion of crisis (as objective crisis and subjective critique/action), what can we say about "crisis of citizenship"? In order to give an answer to this question, it is necessary to look at the elements that constitute modern citizenship. If I can put it broadly, modern category of citizenship, which was established as the main medium of defining a political community after the French Revolution, consists of two interrelated elements: *membership* and *belonging*. Citizens are members of a political community, which is today commonly identified with the nation-state. This membership provides citizens with rights, and

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[25] Gramsci, Antonio (2014), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (NY: International Publishers), p. 276.
[26] Milstein (2015), p. 153. For a further reading on the genealogical and historical trajectory of "crisis," Brian Milstein provides an excellent analysis.

prescribes them with duties. Membership indicates citizens' legal status that removes differentiated and hierarchical application of laws and regulations in a political community, while at the same time distinguishes citizens from non-citizens, or foreigners. As Brubaker describes, membership is the formal category of citizenship that abolishes hierarchical and differentiated order of society, and brings members on an equal footing with a single status: "The conception of citizenship as a general membership status was a product of the struggle of centralizing, rationalizing territorial monarchies against the liberties, immunities, and privileges of feudal lords and corporate bodies."[27]

The nature of membership (its principles and requirements) also implies what form of belonging there is in a given political community. Historically, in some countries, political membership has been determined by the *jus soli* principle, that is, people are considered citizens of the state in which they were born. *Jus soli* principle, in other words, defines nationality and citizenship status on the basis of territoriality. In some other countries, citizenship has been regulated according to *jus sanguinis* principle, which grants people citizenship based on parenthood. Unlike territorial definition of citizenship, *jus sanguinis* requires that citizenship be granted to those whose parents (or in some cases at least one of them) are either citizens or considered eligible to citizenship because of their ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds. It is a descent-based citizenship independent from whether someone is born inside or outside the country in question. These two diverging understandings of citizenship are today becoming less and less mutually exclusive; recent trend following the accelerated mobility and global movement of capital, people, businesses, and goods as well as certain international norms and standards push states to modify their citizenship laws and create new regimes of citizenship based on both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principles.[28]

Based on how political membership is formulated, citizen-belonging takes the form of either *ethnos* or *demos*. The definition that reduces belonging to ethnicity conceptualizes citizenship

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[27] Brubaker, Rogers (1992), *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), p. 41.

[28] Germany is a paradigmatic example of this hybrid system. Until 1999, Germany's citizenship law was based entirely on *jus sanguinis* principle. Largely due to the EU regulations on the citizenship laws in the member states, and partly because of internal disagreements among the political elite about distribution of citizenship rights, Germany introduced *jus soli* principle next to *jus sanguinis*. According to this new regime, whoever is born in Germany after January 1, 2000, is given German citizenship, providing that at least one parent has been a legal resident in Germany for at least eight years. For an extended discussion of these two principles that define modern national citizenship, see: Shachar, Ayelet and Hirschl, Ran (2007), "Jus Soli, Jus Sanguinis, and Jus Tempus," *Western Political Science Association*, 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1580633.

as a homogenous group bound to one another through kinship. In such communities, membership and belonging are fused and almost indistinguishable. Especially after the Cold War, we witnessed the collapse of this exclusive understanding of citizenship. The "crisis of citizenship" in that conjuncture was the following: the rise of ethnically formed nation-states after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia generated ultra-nationalist movements with ethnic substance that led to wars and genocides in the Balkans and some countries in Africa.[29] That experience made it clear, once again, that ethnically defined citizenship leads to a construction of racist, fascist, and ethno-nationalist society. What followed from this catastrophe in the early 1990s was a proliferation of studies responding, on a conceptual level, to the crisis, through new definitions of citizenship with liberal and pluralist contents. If we ignore their analytical and normative differences, "liberal nationalism," "multiculturalism," and "constitutional patriotism" were such liberal-republican projects that tried to respond to this one of the major crises of citizenship in the early 1990s. Through rigorous attempts of political thinkers, such as Jürgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka, and Charles Taylor, ethnically defined citizenship was criticized and tried to be replaced by another understanding of citizenship that is based on a pluralist notion of *demos*.

Whereas liberal-republican notion of citizenship, which brought ethnicity on an equal footing with many other cultural backgrounds, has successfully challenged homogenous conceptions of *belonging*, what it failed to address was the question of *membership* as a legal status. For this view, civil society and public sphere are the realms of "equally" shared members of *demos* but that which still consists of members of states. The question of citizenship is limited to membership, although its boundaries ought to be kept as inclusive as possible. This is the problem that today many thinkers define as "crisis of citizenship" in the terms of a paradox: Habermas defines it as a "paradox of constitutional democracy";[30] Chantal Mouffe discusses it as the "democratic paradox";[31] for Bonnie Honig it is a larger "paradox of politics";[32] and for Paulina Espejo, these are "paradoxes of popular sovereignty."[33]

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[29] For the "crisis of citizenship" in Africa, see especially: Mamdani, Mahmood (1996), *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the LEgacy of Late Colonialism* (NJ: Princeton University Press).

[30] Habermas, Jürgen (2001), "Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles," *Political Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 6, pp. 766-781.

[31] Mouffe, Chantal (2000), *The Democratic Paradox* (London and NY: Verso).

[32] Honig, Bonnie (2009), *Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press).

[33] Espejo, Paulina (2012), "Paradoxes of Popular Sovereignty: A View from Spanish America," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 1053-1065.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these scholars on the issue of paradox(es) of democracy. But one problem that is common to each is the association of citizenship and membership (legal status), which perhaps needs to be reconfigured in a radically different manner. Then, the question is, how can we do this reconfiguration? One way of thinking citizenship beyond membership and belonging to nation-state, I hereby argue, is to shift our focus from "crisis of citizenship" towards "citizenship of crisis." To put differently, it is my contention that crisis of citizenship is not only a time in which scholars try to diagnose its causes on a conceptual or empirical level; equally inherent in crisis of citizenship is the notion of time in which the "subjects" of crisis have a potential power to activate. In such situations, crisis of citizenship can potentially be brought together with "citizenship of crisis," or citizenship in times of crisis. Structural crisis situation is at the same time the movement of mobilization, action, and critique. Whatever the reason behind its emergence, following Milstein's suggestion, "the concept of crisis entails a call for *participation* on the part of those who apply the term."[34] I will return to this point in the last part of my paper.

The association between citizenship and membership has not been unchallenged, however. A successful challenge came from various writings of Engin Isin, who elsewhere have emphasized the performative dimension of citizenship. In his historical-theoretical work, *Being Political*, in which he analyzes how noncitizens appropriate technologies and strategies of citizenship, and form themselves as political actors through different "acts of citizenship," Isin successfully deconstructs existing forms and images of citizenship which were formalized, depoliticized, and narrated in a timeless manner by those who identify themselves with these images. In these ahistorical narratives, which account for different historical periods, we see "[t]he virtuous image of the Greek citizen exercising his rights and obligations in the agora, the austere image of the Roman citizen conducting himself in the forum, and the stirring image of medieval citizens receiving their charter in front of the guildhall"; but behind these seemingly ahistorical and uncontested images, Isin contends, lies "intense struggles, conflicts, and violence to wrest the right to becoming political from dominant groups, which have never surrendered it without struggle."[35]

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[34] Milstein (2015), p. 146.
[35] Isin, Engin (2002), *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 1-2.

Building from his conclusions in *Being Political,* Isin developed the notion of "acts of citizenship," proposing a shift of focus "from the institution of citizenship and the citizen as individual agent" towards "acts of citizenship – that is, collective or individual deeds that rupture social-historical patterns."[36] This perspective thinks of "acts" as ontologically distinguished from "actors" and "actions," but theorizes all three (acts, actors, actions) as an assemblage that pertains to specific spatiotemporal moments.[37] Drawing his "theorizing acts" from Lacan, who distinguishes "act" from "behavior," Arendt's notion of action as the capacity to begin anew, and Bakhtin's ontological differentiation between acts and action, he defines "acts of citizenship as those acts that produce citizens and their others."[38] In this new formulation, what matters is not the already established binaries and identities as citizen/non-citizen, insider/outsider, we/other, but the acts through which citizens and non-citizens are co-constituted within dialogical relationship which can occur in the form of solidarity, agonism, and alienation, or all simultaneously at a given spatiotemporal moment. In this sense, Isin's notion of acts precedes the moment that a constituent power founds its political institutions; as he suggests, "these acts constitute constituents (beings with claims)."[39]

Isin's works on citizenship led to a resurgence of interdisciplinary studies that focus on how the relations between citizens and non-citizens, forms of inclusion and exclusion, and insiders and outsiders, are put into question through "acts of citizenship" in a transformative way. Building on this notion, Anne McNevin conceptualizes political belonging and membership as detached from the statist paradigm through the case of the *Sans Papiers* in the 1990s.[40] Similarly, Peter Nyers develops his notion of "migrant citizenship" which is an idea that sees migration as an autonomous phenomenon with its own motivations, trajectories, and logics, and shows the fluidity and dynamism behind the concept of citizenship at the same time.[41]

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[36] Isin, Engin and Nielsen M. Greg (eds.) (2008), *Acts of Citizenship* (NY: Zed Books), p. 2.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] McNevin, Anne (2006), "Political Belonging in a Neoliberal Era: The Struggle of the Sans-Papiers," *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 135-151.
[41] Nyers, Peter (2015), "Migrant Citizenship and Autonomous Mobilities," *Migration, Mobility, and Displacement*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 135-151.

Isin's idea of "acts of citizenship" is also put into work against Giorgio Agamben's pessimistic account of *homo sacer* as well as Agambenian studies that place refugees, prisoners, and stateless peoples in the "sphere of indistinction," drawn by the sovereign exception, with no political power or agency. As such, Kim Rygiel, for example, explores how people in refugee camps transform camps into political spaces through politics and practices of citizenship.[42] Nando Sigona, on the other hand, conducts an ethnographic study on nomad camps in Italy where Roma people reconfigure their camps as a space of political belonging and membership, which Sigona refers to as "campzenship."[43]

Isin's theorizing of "acts of citizenship" and empirical studies that explore its practices are not the only way of looking at citizenship detached from membership and in terms of practice. There is another important scholarship which theorizes citizenship as the capacity to disrupt the present order of things, or normalized and naturalized practices and patterns in politics in favor of more substantial and extensive freedoms and equalities.   This is part of the project of democratic theory or what Laclau and Mouffe refer as "radical democracy." In their view, radical democracy theorizes politics and political subjectivity beyond conventional structures and institutions of state. Although there is a vast literature in this tradition challenging various aspects of conventional politics (such as representation, political participation, power, identity, etc.), the question of citizenship has hardly gained attention for an investigation neither as a critique nor its redefinition. Balibar is a significant exception to this general lack of interest.

Balibar enters the debate on democratic citizenship by drawing especially from three previous formulations. First, he builds his discussion on citizenship by questioning the forms of inclusion and exclusion, and thus belonging to a political community. Here he borrows the term from Schnapper, who, in a somewhat similar way to Habermas's "constitutional patriotism," tries to detach the idea of community from nation, and attach it to citizenship. Starting from this notion of "community of citizens," Balibar argues that "*it is always the practical confrontation with the different modalities of exclusion…that constitutes the founding*

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[42] Rygiel, Kim (2012), "Politicizing Camps: Forging Transgressive Citizenship in and Through Transit," *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 5-6, pp. 807-825.
[43] Sigona, Nando (2015), "Campzenship: Reimagining the Camp as a Social and Political Space," *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-15.

moment of citizenship, and thus of its periodic test of truth."[44] In this respect, democratization of citizenship lies in the dialectic between constituent and constituted people which enter into conflict for further democratization when the status quo about the existing modality of exclusion (of citizenship) becomes problematic and untenable.[45] Therefore, unlike Schnapper's sociological or Habermas's logical approaches, for Balibar it is the confrontation of constituent and constituted citizenship, which he also describes as the dialectics between insurrection and constitution, that can open up a possibility for equality and freedom in a democratic society.

Second, Balibar also argues, by borrowing the term from Gunsteren (1998), that community of citizens should be considered as "community of fate" rather than "community of descent." This means that democratic society should think of its members as "individuals and groups that they have been 'thrown together' by history, chance, or 'fate' on the same territory or in the same 'polity.'"[46] Such an approach allows for conceptualizing citizenship together with a radical possibility of its recreation by conflicts and confrontations when people with their differences claim to live together in a certain place. "Community of citizens" in this respect rejects the idea of territory as inherited "capital" or true ownership, and the idea of nativism as autochthony.[47]

The third element on which Balibar develops his idea of citizenship is Arendt's notion of "right to have rights." He makes both a minimalist and maximalist reading of this notion. In the minimalist interpretation, "right to have rights" suggests a juridical and moral protection of individuals who are somewhat unable to claim their citizenship rights. The maximalist reading, on the other hand, is the idea that minimal recognition of right to being-with-others in a "common sphere of existence" *already* presupposes or enables "a totality of rights," that Balibar refers to as the "insurrectionary element of democracy."[48] In this vein, he argues that the insurrectionary aspect of democracy is a constituent element of democratic citizenship, because such conflictuality uncovers the intrinsic fragility and the continuous recreation of the modalities of exclusion and inclusion of democratic citizenship. Democratic citizenship is

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[44] Balibar, Etienne (2004), *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, James Swenson (trans.) (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), p. 76.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 189.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

essentially conflictual, otherwise it cannot be democratic. And this conflictuality forces political communities to run the risk of death or its abolishment. Balibar therefore locates insurrection at the heart of democratic citizenship as a political action that continuously challenges the borders of the political, redefines it, or abolishes it if necessary. As he concludes in his other book, *Citizenship*, "insurrection, in its *different* forms, is the active modality of citizenship: the modality that it brings into *action*."[49]

Isin and Balibar are the two significant authors challenging the juridical understanding of citizenship, and try to redefine the concept in terms of performativity and political action. Their contributions to the literature have been so influential that they can be considered as the T. H. Marshall of *active citizenship*. Inasmuch as I learn a great deal from them, there are also some points that need to be problematized in their perspectives. Common to both authors is the notion of citizenship as a modality of exclusion that requires to be democratized, or that *is* being democratized by those who are excluded from it. In Isin's sociological approach, "acts of citizenship" is indeed acts of noncitizens *like* citizens; and the *telos* of these acts is to move to an equal grounding with dominant citizens. Likewise, in Balibar's theoretical perspective, the ultimate purpose of insurgency is to democratize the boundaries of citizenship, and create a paradoxical yet radically inclusive regime of exclusion. Their essentialism towards inclusion and exclusion, which I find highly Eurocentric, prevent them from seeing the dynamic, complex, and multifaceted relationship between citizens and noncitizens, insiders and outsiders, and oppressors and the oppressed. Especially in Balibar's case, the dialectic between insurrection and constitution, or resistance and citizenship is not explored to provide a clear picture of this relationship. Politics of inclusion, I contend, is only one form and objective of democratic resistance. Next to politics of inclusion, we should also add politics of exclusion and politics of emancipation in order to get a deeper picture of the relationship between citizenship and resistance.

Citizenship of Crisis: Politics of Inclusion, Exclusion, and Emancipation

As I argued before, there is an internal link between crisis of citizenship and citizenship of crisis, a link that I tried to capture with the relationship between resistance and citizenship. In

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[49] Balibar, Etienne (2015), *Citizenship*, Thomas Schott-Railton (trans.) (UK: Polity Press), p. 131.

this concluding section, I will briefly examine in what ways this relationship takes place. Let's start with politics of inclusion. Politics of inclusion addresses the crisis of citizenship experienced by those who are excluded from membership or equal juridical status. We see such struggles for inclusion in many different contexts. Some examples for this type of politics can be given as the refugee resistance at the EU borders, irregular migrants (*Sans Papier*) in many Western countries (today especially the United States), ethnic, cultural, religious minorities (as the Kurdish population in Turkey). Historically the civil rights movement, feminist movements, suffragettes, black rights movement are significant examples of politics of inclusion. Through various acts of (civil) disobedience, acts of recognition (seeking group rights for minorities), and acts of citizenship (non-citizens seeking citizenship rights), those historically, sociologically, and politically excluded groups generated crisis of citizenship in which their collective action, or politics of inclusion, first manifested the anti-democratic content of the existing citizenship regime (and democracy), and second allowed them to reconfigure citizenship in a radically different and more inclusive way.

As I underlined before, politics of inclusion is not the only way in which we encounter citizenship in crisis. Another and equally important form of struggle is what I call "politics of exclusion." In this vein, the goal of the collectivities in resistance is not to seek inclusion or recognition, but the opposite; here the problem is the very existence of their inclusion to an unwanted polity (unwanted for many different reasons). In other words, politics of exclusion challenges the problem that comes with the citizenship-status itself. We see this problem especially in the postcolonial contexts where indigenous peoples face assimilation, dispossession, and discrimination because of the very fact that they are given citizenship status by the colonizer states. In the case of the United States, for example, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz argues that "the US government imposed unsolicited citizenship on American Indians with the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, gesturing toward assimilation and dissolving nations."[50] Also in some other countries in Latin America and Canada, we see mobilizations of indigenous peoples questioning citizenship regimes not to be *recognized* as citizens but to be able to constitute themselves, in Glenn Coulthard's articulation, "through cultural practices of individual and collective self-fashioning that seek to *prefigure* radical alternatives to the

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[50] Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne (2014), *An Indigenous People's History of the United States* (NY: Beacon Press), p. 169.

structural and subjective dimensions of colonial power."[51] This kind of politics of exclusion in the decolonial movements and postcolonial contexts takes place in the form of what Audra Simpson coins as "refusal." In her case study of Mohawks of Kahnawá:ke, one of the nations that belong to the Iraquois Confederacy, she explores how indigenous peoples establish their collective identity, belonging, community membership, and sovereignty (as "nested" within the settler sovereignty) by taking up an offensive position against the settler states, and *refusing* the "gifts" of citizenship, membership, social and political rights, passports, and ultimately refusing the recognition by the colonizers.[52] In this context, we encounter acts of refusal in many ways, such as refusing to vote, to pay taxes, and refusing the passports given by settler states and travelling internationally with indigenous passports.

Politics of exclusion also appears in some contexts in the form of struggle for *autonomy* and/or *secession*. As a derivative of Greek *stasis* and Latin *seditio*, acts of secession has a very long history that dates back to the first plebeian secession in the Roman Republic in 494 BC. This idea of secession in Rome was not about carving out a territory while physically remaining in the same place; in contrast, secession meant a physical withdrawal of the Roman plebs in response to the debt crisis and the patricians' self-authorized command to plebs to join the army for the approaching war. We see a similar withdrawal in the seventeenth century England, where the Levellers acted similarly.[53] Acts of secession become identified as territorial separation especially after the French and American Revolutions, which signaled the crisis of traditional imperialism, and the collapse of imperial powers. In the late eighteenth century, secession(ism) became associated with the theory of state resistance.[54]

Finally, the third way of encounter between citizenship and resistance is what I depict as "politics of emancipation." Politics of emancipation *may* include all the previous politics of resistance. For example, disobedience is part of politics of inclusion, but embedded in the moral/ethical nature of such actions is freedom from oppression. Historically conscientious

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[51] Coulthard, Glenn Sean (2009), *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 18.
[52] Simpson, Audra (2013), *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of the Settler States* (Durham and London: Duke University Press), pp. 7-12.
[53] For an excellent discussion on this subject, see Breaugh, Martin (2013), *The Plebeian Experience: A Discontinuous History of Political Freedom* (NY: Columbia University Press).
[54] See especially, Goldstein, Leslie Friedman (2001), *Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University).

objection against conscription in many countries is one of the examples that intersect politics of inclusion and politics of emancipation. Similarly, the struggle for democratic autonomy and federation by the peoples of Rojava in Syria could be given as an example that depicts the intersection of politics of exclusion with politics of emancipation. However, in terms of emancipatory politics, resistance and citizenship also encounters in the acts of revolution, which are rare but the most radical version of the relationship between resistance and citizenship.

Conclusion

In this paper, I explored questions of the crisis of citizenship and return of resistance in a co-constitutive relationship. By bringing the notion of "crisis" as an entry point to analyzing their relationship, I argued that resistance and citizenship intersect in three ways: politics of inclusion understood as acts of disobedience, recognition, and acts of citizenship; politics of exclusion, namely acts of refusal and acts of secession and autonomy; and politics of emancipation which includes the previous types of political actions but also the acts of revolution.